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1998ESTIMATING A EUROPEAN DEMAND FOR MONEY
Abstract
European Monetary Union will come into existence in 1999. This raises questions related to
the monetary policy targets that will be adopted by the European Central Bank (ECB). For
both likely candidates, targeting a money aggregate or an inflation target, the existence of a
stable money demand function at a European level is important. In this paper estimates of such
a European money demand for narrow and broad money for the actual 11 EMU countries
based on quarterly aggregate data from 1964 to 1994 are presented. It is argued that
statistically satisfactory and economically interpretable functions can be found. The robustness
of the results is further evaluated using alternative country groups. Moreover, the estimated
models appear to be stable over a period of 20 quarters. This raises the hopes that the ECB
will face a stable money demand and be able - at least for a certain time - to use past aggregate
data for policy purposes.
Keywords: European Money Demand, Monetary Policy, European Monetary Union
JEL:  E41, F33, E52, E471
1. Introduction
As a result of the decisions made by the EU heads of government in the European Council on
2 May 1998 concerning the participants of European Monetary Union (EMU), EMU is going
to start in January 1999 as originally set out in the Treaty of Maastricht.
One of the more controversial issues left on the agenda is the formulation of European Central
Bank (ECB) policies, and especially the question of targeting a monetary aggregate versus
using an inflation target. While the former is strongly supported by the German Bundesbank,
the latter has been adopted by the UK government since 1993. But as the UK is not going to
be a founding member of EMU, money targeting is likely to become the dominant strategy.
Otmar Issing, chief economist of the ECB, has indicated, though, that he could imagine using
an inflation target as an additional monetary policy target (Issing (1998)).
Controlling a money aggregate presupposes the existence of a stable demand for money. If
money demand fluctuates wildly, the transmission mechanism of monetary policy becomes
extremely complicated, and the ability of the central bank to control money, and thereby
inflation, is severely reduced.
However, even the use of an inflation target does not really alleviate the problems connected
with an unstable money demand, the reason being that it is simply not possible to control
inflation directly. Hence the term ‘inflation targeting’ hides the fact that the link between
inflation and monetary policy is not a straightforward one and, moreover, the time-horizon of
inflation targets tends to be medium-term. Thus, money aggregates are likely to continue
performing an important role as a source of information for forecasting inflation rates and an
intervention indicator for monetary policy.
Consequently, the work of the ECB would be greatly simplified if the demand for the single
European currency, the Euro, was a stable function of a small number of variables. In this
paper we are concerned with the attempt to empirically estimate such a European money
demand function. We are trying to find out whether something like an aggregate demand
relationship for the Euro could exist, how it may look like and whether it is likely to be stable
or not.
There exist a number of articles in the literature on this issue. Here we just want to sketch
some of the more important contributions. For a general overview see van Riet (1993),
Monticelli and Papi (1996) and Bruggeman (1997b). The seminal paper is the one by Kremers
and Lane (1990). They postulate that an interpretable and stable European (they chose an2
aggregate of seven countries) demand for narrow money can be found. Some criticisms on
their study are raised by Arnold (1992) and Barr (1992).
A study involving European money demand estimates for M1 and M2 is presented by Artis et
al. (1993). Using a similar approach, but allowing for a different way of converting the
variables denominated in the respective national currencies, they also find a stable money
demand equation. Monticelli and Strauss-Kahn (1993) perform an analysis based on M3,
including all ERM members in mid-1992. See also Bruggeman (1997a) on the influences of
using different broad money aggregates and Wesche (1997) for employing Divisa money.
A closer investigation of the validity of the aggregation process for the four major EU
countries has been undertaken by Wesche (1994). Her general conclusion is that the aggregate
money demand function is useful for forecasting purposes and the aggregation bias is
considered relatively modest for Germany, France and Italy. Artis et al. (1993) raise a related
point on the problem of aggregation.
The question of the adequacy of aggregate money demand equations is addressed from a
microeconomic utility-maximising perspective by Janssen and Bhundia (1998) and Spencer
(1997). The latter finds that the use of aggregate EU data is supported by the utility-
maximising framework. Contrary to this result, Janssen and Bhundia (1998) argue that since
monetary aggregates are not weakly separable from real income, the simple construction of an
EU-wide aggregate is invalid. While their approach is interesting as an application of a
stringent methodology, it is unlikely that many national money demand functions would pass
their empirical test and it is unclear whether their statistical rejection of weak separability is
economically relevant.
A useful summary of issues surrounding the estimation procedure and a survey of existing
national money demand estimates for the EU are provided by Fase (1994), Monticelli and
Strauss-Kahn (1992) and Browne, Fagan and Henry (1997). Fair (1987) gives an older but
extensive comparison of money demand estimates involving 27 countries, including EU
members. Cassard, Lane and Masson (1997) show, additionally to providing money demand
estimates for some EU countries, that a European monetary aggregate improves the prediction
of German inflation compared to using a German aggregate.
Some critical remarks concerning the whole procedure of estimating aggregate European
money demand functions are expressed by Arnold (1994). He does not believe in the argument
that these aggregate functions are more stable than national ones because they incorporate the
effects of currency substitution. In his cross-sectional analysis he cannot find evidence that3
smaller countries show greater instability of money demand functions than larger countries.
However, a different position is maintained in Lane and Poloz (1992), Angeloni et al. (1994)
and Spencer (1997), who argue that currency substitution is important.
This study seeks to extend the literature in several directions. First, a somewhat more
developed econometric methodology is applied for estimating the European money demand.
Some evidence is presented that some of the money demand estimates reported in the literature
should have taken place within a system context. Second, the actual group of countries which
will form EMU in 1999 is used in the analysis. Third, a much greater emphasis is placed on
evaluating the forecasting properties of the estimated European money demand functions than
in the other studies.
In the following section, some important methodological problems are addressed. Section three
explains the econometric approach, and the data base is briefly described. Then in section four
we come to the estimation of long-run money demand equations for a group consisting of ten
countries likely to form EMU. Finally, in the conclusion, the preceding results are brought
together and are evaluated with respect to the overall statistical performance and policy
relevance.
2. Some Methodological Problems
It needs to be stressed that there exist a number of problems with drawing conclusions from
European money demand estimates for monetary policy. The most prominent problem on a
theoretical level is the one connected with the idea of the ‘Lucas’ critique’: To be able to put
any economic meaning into the estimates of aggregate money demand functions for countries
forming EMU, we have to assume that the future behaviour can be derived from past data. In
other words, we assume that the creation of EMU and the use of the money demand estimates
by the ECB will not lead to a structural break in people’s behaviour.
A priori, this does not appear to be very likely, and Arnold and De Vries (1998) argue that
there are indeed strong reasons to expect structural changes to occur. However, at least three
arguments can be set forth to support the relevance of conclusions based on past behaviour.
The first one builds upon the distinction between temporary and permanent effects of the
economic shock. As an example, take the experiences from German monetary union. A
considerable amount of research has been undertaken to examine the effects of German4
monetary union on national money demand. The results are not clear-cut, but a majority of
studies point towards either finding no great effect or only a temporary one (see OECD
(1993), von Hagen (1993), Falk and Funke (1995), Hansen and Kim (1995) or Wolters and
Lütkepohl (1997)).
1 Thus even though the creation of EMU will cause a shock on the money
market, this effect may well be only of a temporary nature. In this case, the ECB would have
no great problems in accounting for the break and employing data from the pre-unification
period as a guideline to monetary policy making. But there can be no doubt that EMU is a
much greater undertaking than German monetary union, where the whole West-German
political and economical system – including the way monetary policy is performed - was
basically imposed onto East-Germany. Hence this comparison should only be seen as
suggestive, but not compelling.
A second argument can be based on the potentially stabilising effects brought about by creating
a monetary union of countries already forming a zone of free capital mobility - like the EU -
whose respective citizens engage in mutual, i.e. intra-EU, currency substitution. Since
economic agents can switch in and out of a national money very easily, their individually
optimal economic action may cause the respective national money demand to become highly
unstable. Now, if the countries which experience the biggest share of mutual currency
substitution entered into a monetary union, these destabilising currency substitution effects
would be removed by definition.
Empirical studies trying to measure the substitution effects are neither fully convincing on a
methodological level, nor are the conclusions entirely clear (see e.g. Lane and Poloz (1992),
Angeloni et al. (1994) or Arnold (1994)). In the analysis of national money demand functions
presented by Hayo (1998, p. 164ff), for instance, little evidence of empirically important
currency substitution was found. However, it is likely that even if currency substitution is not
very important at present, it will become more important in the future due to an increasing
degree of money market integration and the computerisation of trading patterns. Thus the
reasoning would be that by forming a (large) monetary union, important prospective
opportunities for currency substitution will be removed today and thereby future fluctuations in
national money demand due to these currency substitution effects can be avoided.
2
Third, there will be behavioural inertia in adapting to the new monetary framework. This is
considered here as the most persuasive reason for the usefulness of European money demand
                                                       
1 However, Funke (1996) claims to have found permanent effects.
2 But there can still be currency substitution between the Euro and all other currencies left in the world
economy, with much the same negative effect on the stability of European money demand.5
estimates based on historical data. At the beginning of EMU, market participants will have to
adjust to a situation which they cannot evaluate very precisely. They will need time to gain
experience and learn about the new monetary environment. While this takes place they will
likely continue to behave in the same way as they did before EMU, updating their behaviour
when new information appears. After some time, say a couple of years, it will become clear
how monetary policy will be conducted by the ECB and the adjustment process of economic
agents will be complete. Therefore, the information gained by using past data is likely to yield
only temporary insights and is bound to become obsolete with time.
If one of these lines of reasoning is accepted, past data can be used by the ECB as a basis for
monetary policy. In any case, an attempt has to be made to make the best possible guess for
the future.
Whether a future European money demand will be more stable is difficult to assess. As a
stabilising force there is the increase of the currency area which will reduce the likelihood of
idiosyncratic shocks and lessen the impact of destabilising currency substitution. This effect
could be offset by a convergence in the behaviour of economic agents when they face an
identical monetary policy environment in EMU. Moreover, there may be an increasing amount
of currency substitution between the Euro and other monies in the rest of the world. Finally,
money demand instability may also be due to the effects originating from financial innovations.
The basic argument is that the creation of a monetary union will lead to increased competition
between financial intermediaries, forcing them to offer more differentiated financial products
and, consequently, that money demand instability will rise as a result of EMU.
3
3. Aggregation, Econometric Specification and Data Base
Next we can address some of the numerous technical difficulties involved in the estimation of a
European money demand function.
First, how do we aggregate the national economic values into ‘European’ variables? This could
be seen as an important technical problem, and is regarded as such in many articles in the
literature briefly reviewed above. However, much more difficult than the actual technical
problems involved in computing these European values are the questions of interpretation.
                                                       
3 It is also possible, see for example Thornton (1994), that financial innovations eliminate monetary
transmission mechanisms - like the credit channel - which are difficult to control by the central bank.6
Even assuming that we are indeed measuring something like European variables, there remain
many uncertainties. Apart from the general econometric problem that the empirically employed
variables do not fully reflect their theoretical counterparts, we have to face the danger of
getting aggregation biases (cf. Lovell (1973), Pesaran et al. (1989)). However, as pointed out
theoretically by Grunfeld and Griliches (1960), there may also exist aggregation gains if we
encounter specification problems at the micro level. Applying this reasoning, we would expect
to find specification biases in the individual money demand estimates (a recent survey of the
literature is given in Laidler (1993)), which may offset each other in the aggregation process
This can be seen as another argument in favour of aggregating money demand functions.
The net effect of gains and losses from aggregation is difficult to assess in theory. Judging from
the comparison of empirical studies of money demand in European countries (see Monticelli
and Strauss-Kahn (1992) or Fase (1994)), we cannot a priori expect the aggregation bias to be
negligible. This is a conclusion reached also by Wesche (1994), who uses a more formal
empirical analysis to investigate the basis for aggregation of the four largest EU countries. A
study by Hayo (1998, p. 164ff) demonstrates, however, that for almost all EU countries stable
long-run money demand functions based on very similar specifications can be estimated. In
particular, an income elasticity of unity was found for about half of the countries, while the
variation in the estimates of the interest-rate semi-elasticity appeared to be somewhat higher.
Hence it is unlikely that aggregation biases are excessively large.
The agreement reached by the European Council says that 11 countries will join EMU from the
beginning. Since there are no separate data on money aggregates for Luxembourg available
due to its monetary union with Belgium, we in fact only use 10 countries. But since this will
not affect our results, the constructed aggregate is called EMU11 and it includes the following
states:
EMU11 = Germany, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, Austria, Finland, Italy, Spain, 
Portugal.
Regarding the issue of econometric methodology, the approach applied here is similar to the
one put forward by Clements and Mizon (1991) or Hendry and Mizon (1993). We start from a
general VAR system and proceed by a sequential testing down process to simplify the model.
This procedure has been termed ‘general-to-specific’ modelling (see Hendry (1993)).
4
                                                       
4 A recent survey of econometric methodology is presented by Hayo (1997).7
After analysing the univariate time-series properties, with the finding of difference stationarity,
the modelling of European money demand starts from an unrestricted VAR with five lags. This
is sufficient to remove the autocorrelation of the residuals according to LM-tests. Then, in a
sequential testing-down process, the lags are removed based on an F-test at a 5% (nominal)
significance level. To capture the long-run characteristics of money demand functions, we
estimate a stationary cointegrating vector, which can be interpreted as the long-run equilibrium
of the model.
The testing and estimation of the cointegration vectors is done using the reduced rank
procedure introduced by Johansen (1988). The main criteria guiding the specification are a
theoretically consistent sign on the estimated parameters, and a negative a-value, which is the
adjustment coefficient of the long-run equilibrium in an error-correction model. A plausible
adjustment parameter should be negative and large enough in absolute terms. The former is
necessary to interpret the relationship as an error-correction mechanism, while the latter
ensures that the cointegrating relationship influences the short-run dynamics in an
economically, and not only statistically, significant way (see McCloskey and Ziliak (1996)).
Moreover, the estimates of the adjustment vector can be used to test for weak exogeneity of
the included variables, which has been demonstrated by Johansen (1992a, 1992b). As discussed
in Engle et al. (1983), when the variables are weakly exogenous with respect to the parameters
of interest, we do not have to model the marginal process. In other words, if it should turn out
that the adjustment parameters were not significantly different from zero for the equations
explaining GDP growth and interest rate changes, no significant information would be lost
when modelling the money demand equation using just a single equation instead of a three-
variable system.
A crucial point to note is the dependence of the whole analysis on the stability of the estimated
money demand relationship. Only if the resulting equation is stable can we claim to have
estimated a money demand function at all, as the dependent variable is a monetary aggregate,
which is a reduced form of the effects of money demand and supply. To be able to identify the
equation as a money demand function, it needs to be stable, and all the movement must be
attributable to changes in money supply.
5 To stress the importance of this aspect, as well as the
significance of stability from the point of view of monetary policy, we have reserved 20
observations for forecasting purposes.
                                                       
5 Alternatively, identification would be possible by assuming a perfectly elastic money suppley. However, this
does not appear to be very realistic.8
The variables employed in this study are both narrow (usually M1) and broad (usually M3)
money, income as a scale variable (GDP), and long-run interest rates (typically government
bonds rates) as a measure of the opportunity costs of holding money. We use long-term
interest rates for the analysis, as recommended, for instance, by Poole (1988).
6 The long-run
interest rate can be viewed as an average of future expected short-term rates assuming that the
expectations hypothesis of the term structure holds. While the money and income variables
enter in logarithms, the interest rate is in levels, i.e. in percent per year. This is standard
practice, rationalised, for example, in Fair (1987).
Adding other variables, like US interest rates or exchange rates, does not appear to improve
the estimates very much. Rather, the forecasting performance of the system tends to decrease.
And since it is believed that simplicity is important in econometric modelling (see Hayo
(forthcoming) for some methodological arguments) it was decided to work within the
framework of this small VAR system. Thus, we specify the long-run equation in the following
form:
t t 2 t 1 t t v INT LGDP ) LMQ or ( LM + b + b = (1)
where: LM = log of real narrow money
LMQ = log of real broad money
LGDP = log of GDP
INT = aggregate interest rate
b1 = income elasticity of money demand
b2 = interest rate semi-elasticity of money demand
vt = white-noise error.
These are aggregate values, and it is necessary to at least sketch the derivation of these
variables. Most of the national variables have been taken from the OECD data base on CD-
Rom (Main Economic Indicators 1996/1), but some are also added from the International
Financial Statistics series. Quarterly data are utilised, ranging from 1964:1 to 1994:4. Many of
the series are seasonally adjusted, but some are not. Hence deterministic dummies are included
in all of the regressions. Some national series had to be estimated from annual data or related
series, using univariate representations, multivariate models or the procedure described in
Chow and Lin (1973).
 7
                                                       
6 Due to problems of data availability, a short-term interest rate was employed for Greece, Spain and Finland.
Considering their relatively low income weight, this should not bias the results very much.
7 A complete source list of the variables, as well as the used data sets, are available from the author upon
request.9
In constructing aggregate variables, the following procedure, adapted from Kremers and Lane
(1990), has been followed. First, purchasing power parities (OECD) from 1990 were employed
to convert national currencies into Deutschmarks. Then aggregate nominal and real European
income values are constructed by adding up the converted national values. From these two
aggregates, a European income deflator is derived. This deflator is used to get real European
money from the sum of converted national money aggregates. Finally, a European interest rate
is created through weighing the national rates by the ratio of respective national real income to
European real income, and adding them up.
Since the problems of avoiding strong movements of the actual exchange rates and the ones
connected with using an arbitrarily fixed exchange rate are difficult to avoid, the use of
purchasing power parities, in spite of its own weaknesses, appears to be the best choice. Artis
et al. (1993), who use fixed exchange rates, report that their findings are similar to Kremers
and Lane’s (1990) results based on applying purchasing power parities. Monticelli and Strauss-
Kahn (1993) also report that their results are relatively insensitive to the way the conversion
into a common currency is done. This indicates some robustness of the estimates with respect
to the conversion procedure.
8
Finally, we have to look at the time series properties of the created variables. In this paper, we
have applied augmented Dickey-Fuller tests to investigate this question (see Table A1 in the
Appendix). The results clearly show that the variables are difference stationary, in short I(1).
These findings appear to be quite robust in respect of the way the augmentation is done.
Therefore suffice to say that we excluded the lags using a sequential testing-down procedure,
and checked the success of the augmentation with the help of LM-tests for autocorrelation (a
more detailed description can be found in Hayo (1994)).
We commence our discussion with the core of the paper: the empirical analysis of the
European demand for the EMU candidates. Drawing on the large theoretical and empirical
literature on this issue (see Laidler (1993, 160f)), we estimate a demand function for real
money. The deflator for money is the implicit price deflator derived from the construction of
European nominal and real GDP.
                                                       
8 One may also think of using ‘fundamental equilibrium exchange rates’ for converting the values. But there
still exist numerous difficulties connected with this approach, which are even admitted by some of its main
proponents (see Williamson (1994)).10
4. Cointegration Analysis and Long-run Money Demand
We start off our analysis by looking at the results of modelling the aggregate demand for
money for the prospective member countries. In Table 1, the estimates for the cointegrating
vector of the EMU11-variables are given. In addition to the variables named above, a constant,
deterministic dummies and a trend term were added as unrestricted variables to the analysis.
Tab. 1: Estimating and testing the cointegration vectors for EMU11




H0 Eigenvalue LR(r,r+1) LR(r,N) Eigenvalue LR(r,r+1) LR(r,N)
r = 0 0.26 26.6* 41.9** 0.23 26.2* 43.9**
r £ 1 0.09 9.8 15.2 0.12 12.7 17.6
r £ 2 0.05 5.4 5.4 0.05 4.9 4.9
LMEMU11 LGDPEMU11 INTEMU11 LMQEMU11 LGDPEMU11 INTEMU11
$¢ b 1 -1.55 0.21 1 -1.16 0.03
a¢ ˆ -0.02 -0.01 -0.26 -0.15 -0.02 -1.02
Notes: LR(r,r+1) are the test statistics for the maximum eigenvalue test, and LR(r, N) for the trace test. The
critical values are taken from Osterwald-Lenum (1992).  $ b is the cointegrating vector and  $ a  the corresponding
adjustment vector. * (**) indicates significance at a 5% (1%) level.
In the first vertical part of the table, the outcomes for narrow money, and in the second part
the ones for broad money, are displayed. The second row of the table indicates the remaining
number of lags of the respective VAR. In the following section of the table, the tests on the
cointegrating vectors are given. Two likelihood ratio tests are calculated, the maximum
eigenvalue test (LR(r,r+1)) and the trace test (LR(r,N)) (see Johansen and Juselius (1990) for
more details). Throughout this study, one (two) asterisk(s) indicates a rejection of the null
hypothesis at a 5% (1%) level.
In the next row, the actual estimates of the significant cointegrating vector, named  $ b, are
recorded. Finally, in the last part of the table, the estimates of the relevant adjustment vector
for cointegrating vector  $ b, labelled  $ a, are collected. The first element of  $ a gives the weight
attached to the cointegration vector,  $ b, standardised with respect to money.11
4.1 Narrow Money Cointegration Vector
Starting off with narrow money, we find that exactly one significant cointegrating vector can
be extracted. The relevant adjustment coefficient (-0.02) is small in absolute terms and
negative.
In another step we test restrictions on the cointegration and adjustment vectors by applying
likelihood ratio tests involving the eigenvalues of the system - which are distributed as Chi
2
random variables - and setting the rank equal to one. The results are given in Table 2:
Tab. 2: Testing restrictions on cointegrating and adjustment vectors for narrow money
Restrictions on  ' ˆ b ' ˆ b =(1,-1,0) ' ˆ b =(1,-1,u) ' ˆ b =(1,-1,u) ' ˆ b =(1,-1,u) ' ˆ b =(1,-1,u)







Note: ‘u’ indicates unrestricted estimation of the respective parameter. * (**) indicates significance at a 5%
(1%) level.
In the second column of this table, restrictions reflecting the strong version of a classical
money demand function are being tested, namely assuming a unit income elasticity of money
demand and a zero interest rate semi-elasticity. The test statistic given in the last line of the
table shows that the restrictions have to be rejected. But dropping the constraint on the interest
rate - as shown in column three - leads to a restriction that cannot be rejected at a 5%-
significance level. In the next step, restrictions on the adjustment vector are introduced. In
column four the unit coefficient restriction on the cointegration vector is carried over, and it is
jointly tested with the hypothesis that the income and interest variables are weakly exogenous
with respect to the money demand equation. We reject this hypothesis, as well as the one
where the zero constraint on the income variable has been dropped presented in column five.
In column six, the joint hypothesis of an income elasticity of unity and money being weakly
exogenous with respect to the interest rate variable cannot be rejected. The restricted
cointegration vector based on the last column in Table 2 takes the following form:
ECLMt = LMt – LGDPt + 0.10 INTt  (2)
As can be seen when comparing this result with the unrestricted estimate given in Table 1, both
income and interest rate semi-elasticity estimates are lower now. To see whether this12
restriction holds up over time, the LR-test of this restriction has been computed recursively
and printed in Figure 1. As is apparent from the graph, the restriction does not even come
close to a rejection at the 5%-level. Thus in the estimation of the dynamic model presented
below, an error-correction term is used, the computation of which is based on Equation (2).
Fig. 1: Recursively computed test of cointegration restriction for narrow money
Moreover, the estimation will take place within the framework of a two-equation system, i.e.
using equations for money and income.
4.2 Broad Money Cointegration Vector
Results for the cointegration analysis for broad money are shown in the right part of Table 1.
Again we find one significant cointegrating vector. Proceeding as before for narrow money, we
test a number of restrictions on the results of the cointegration analysis, the results of which
are given in Table 3. Here only the zero restriction on the interest rate in the cointegrating
vector is rejected. Hence both income and interest rate can be regarded as weakly exogenous









Tab. 3: Testing restrictions on cointegrating and adjustment vectors for broad money
Restrictions on  ' ˆ b ' ˆ b =(1,-1,0) ' ˆ b =(1,-1,u) ' ˆ b =(1,-1,u) ' ˆ b =(1,-1,u) ' ˆ b =(1,-1,u)







Note: ‘u’ indicates unrestricted estimation of the respective parameter. * (**) indicates significance at a 5%
(1%) level.
The resulting error-correction term for the dynamic model of broad money is calculated as:
ECLMQt = LMQt – LGDPt + 0.023 INTt  (3)
Again we test the restriction recursively and the result can be found in Figure 2.
Fig. 2: Recursively computed test of cointegration restriction for broad money
The restriction is valid over the estimated period at all data points, especially from 1987
onwards. Consequently, the relation given in Equation (3) is used as an error-correction term
for broad money in the subsequent analysis.









5. Estimating Short-Run Money Demand Functions
In this section, short-run, dynamic money demand functions are estimated with the help of
error-correction models. In addition to the variables presented in the preceding sections, the
change in the inflation rate and some dummy variables were added to the models.
Starting with the latter, impulse dummies for the last quarter of 1986 and the first quarter of
1987 have been included. The reason for that is that there is a break in the money variables for
France based on a change in the series as given in the IFS. In the case of broad money, another
impulse dummy - for the last quarter of 1969 - was added, since the observation appeared to
be an outlier, causing some problems with non-normality of the residuals.
More importantly, the change in the European inflation rate – defined as first differences of the
change of the GDP deflator (DINFt) – was also added as a regressor. In a world without any
rigidities, the inflation rate should play no role in money demand estimates, since both money
and income are measured in real terms. At least two arguments can be brought forward which
rationalise the inclusion of the inflation rate. First, when investors hold real assets as a large
proportion of their portfolios, and assuming that the inflation rate measures the yield of real
assets, then changes in the inflation rate can have an effect on the demand for money. Second,
it is possible that interest rate and inflation rate are not perfectly correlated (see Baba et al.
(1992)) due to reasons such as distorted money and capital markets or administrative
influences on the formation of interest rates.
But including the inflation rate - which was found to be I(1) - in the cointegration relationship
destroys the theoretically consistent estimates obtained from the three variable vector.
Therefore it was decided to include it in the short-run but not in the long-run part of the model.
Moreover, the contribution to the modelling success by the inflation variable lies only in the
reduction of the standard error of regression, while it does not improve the forecasting
performance.
5.1 Modelling Narrow Money
Incorporating the considerations given in the previous paragraphs into the modelling process,
we commence the discussion with the case of narrow money. A full error-correction system
containing the variables in differences (D is the first-order differences operator) is estimated,
including the first lag of the error-correction term computed in Equation (2) in levels. Then a15
general-to-specific reduction process based on F-tests at a 5%-significance level is used to
eliminate the number of lagged variables. Finally, the parsimonious model presented later in
Table 5 is estimated employing full maximum likelihood estimation techniques.
Before we come to the interpretation of the results, a number of diagnostic tests have been
computed in Table 4 to evaluate the statistical properties of the model. None of the tests
computed here indicates a violation of statistical assumptions.
 9 The standard error is small for
both money and income equations. A very positive impression is also conveyed by the
forecasting statistics. The null of stable parameters of the model can neither be rejected in the
Chi
2-form of the test, nor in its approximate F-test form.




 F(20,164) = 0.6
AR Test:
 F(5,84) = 1.6
AR Test:











 F(45,223) = 1.2
White-Test (A):
 F(15,73) = 1.4
White-Test (A):
 F(12,80) = 1.1
Vector White-Test (B):
 F(126,144) = 1.0
White-Test (B):
 F(42,46) = 0.99
White-Test (B):
 F(42,46) = 0.85
ARCH-Test:
 F(4,81) = 0.49
ARCH-Test:
 F(4,81) = 0.94
Standard Errors: 0.011 0.009
Forecasting Tests:
Standard Chow-type test: Chi
2(40) = 50.9, F(40,93) = 1.27
Allowing for parameter uncertainty: Chi
2(40) = 48.3, F(40,93)=1.21
LR-Test against the system: Chi
2(7) = 8.5
Note: White-Test (A) includes only squared regressors in the auxiliary regression, while White-Test (B) also
includes cross-products of the regressors. The latter may also be interpreted as a test for functional form. * (**)
indicates significance at a 5% (1%) level.
The predictive ability of the money demand equation is graphically demonstrated in Figure 3.
In this graph, one-step ahead forecasts with their corresponding 95%-confidence intervals are
printed (+/- two standard errors) along with the actual values for these data points. It can be
seen that the actual values never fall outside the confidence intervals except in 1991:1. This
failing is readily explainable, though: it is simply connected with the economic consequences of
                                                       
9 A detailed description of the tests can be found in Doornik and Hendry (1997).16
German re-unification. Note how closely the forecasts track the actual values even at the end
of the forecasting period.
Fig. 3: Out-of-sample forecasts of narrow money demand equation
Connecting this finding with the literature on the effects of German monetary union mentioned
above, we can support the view that this event only caused temporary instability, at least in the
European aggregates.
Using recursive estimation, the stability characteristics can be further analysed. In Figure 4, the
results of three variants of the Chow-test are plotted. In the first of the three graphs, the
Chow-test is computed in a one-step progression from the start of the sample (1up). In the
second graph, the test statistic is computed against the starting point of the sample while
moving toward the end of the sample (Nup), and in the last graph the statistic is calculated
against the sample endpoint while also steadily approaching this endpoint (Ndn). It is apparent
that none of the tests comes even close to rejecting the null hypothesis of stable parameters at
a 5% significance level.
In the last row of Table 4, the encompassing test is presented, which does not reject. This
means that the model can be seen as a valid reduction of the underlying unrestricted VAR.









Fig. 4: Recursive Chow-tests for narrow money model
To see whether the over-identifying restrictions hold up over time, the encompassing test is
also calculated recursively and printed in Figure 5.
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Again we can conclude that there is no rejection of the null hypothesis, the over-identifying
restrictions would be valid over the whole sample period. In view of these excellent results, we
can now look at the actual estimates given in Table 5.
Tab. 5: Estimating a dynamic model of narrow money
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob. HCSE
Equation for DLM
DINTt-1 -0.01 0.003 -3.55 0.0006 0.003
DINFt -1.03 0.278 -3.71 0.0004 0.262
DINFt-1 -0.55 0.252 -2.17 0.0323 0.221
ECMLMt-1 -0.02 0.006 -3.88 0.0002 0.005
DU87Q1 0.05 0.011 4.39 0.0000 0.003
Constant -0.02 0.004 -4.29 0.0000 0.003
Seasonalt -0.05 0.003 -14.6 0.0000 0.004
Seasonalt-2 -0.03 0.003 -9.70 0.0000 0.003
Equation for DLGDP
DLMt-1 0.21 0.044 4.76 0.0000 0.052
DLGDPt-3 0.18 0.079 2.32 0.0225 0.092
ECMLMt-1 -0.02 0.002 -8.03 0.0000 0.002
DU87Q1 -0.01 0.009 -1.52 0.1325 0.002
Seasonalt -0.02 0.002 -8.15 0.0000 0.003
In the money demand equation, only three dynamic variables are left. First we find an interest
rate variable lagged by one period with a negative coefficient. This means that additionally to
the negative impact of the interest rate as captured within the long-run equilibrium, there is a
negative short-run influence, strengthening the adjustment of money demand to interest rate
changes. This is similarly true of a change in the inflation rate, since both the current and a
lagged value are negative and significantly different from zero. Thus although the inflation rate
does not appear to be important for the long-run equilibrium of money demand, it has an effect
in the short-run. The opposite seems to be the case for the income variable.
The error-correction term is highly significant and it shows the theory-consistent negative sign.
However, the absolute influence of deviations from the long-run equilibrium is relatively small.
Consequently, when money demand is pushed out of equilibrium by exogenous shocks, the
forces pulling it back are comparatively small. Finally, the dummy capturing the break in the
statistical definition, a constant and some seasonal dummies are of importance too.19
Income growth is characterised by being positively influenced through one-period lagged
money growth. This finding can be regarded as evidence of Granger-causality going from
money to output. Another determinant is the value of GDP growth lagged three periods. As
the sign is also positive, there are persistency effects in growth rates present, even though the
variables are stationary and the model allows for interdependencies with other factors.
The parameter of the error-correction term is also significantly negative and as small as the one
present in the money equation. The dummy for the first quarter of 1987 is not significant
employing normal standard errors. Even though the diagnostic tests do not indicate deviations
from homoscedasticity, the value of the heteroscedasticity consistent standard error is much
lower. In view of that, the variable has been left in the equation.
5.2 Modelling Broad Money
Based on the results of the cointegration tests, we can specify the money demand function as a
single equation.









 F(16,70) = 0.76
White-Test (B):
 F(41,45) = 0.65
ARCH-Test:
 F(4,79) = 1.17
Standard Errors: 0.0065
Forecasting Tests:
Standard Chow-type test: Chi
2(20) = 22.3, F(20,87) = 1.11
Allowing for parameter uncertainty: Chi
2(20) = 20.1, F(20,87)=1.01
LR-Test against the system: Chi
2(10) = 9.5
Note: White-Test (A) includes only squared regressors in the auxiliary regression, while White-Test (B) also
includes cross-products of the regressors. The latter may also be interpreted as a test for functional form. * (**)
indicates significance at a 5% (1%) level.
As indicated above, an additional dummy variable is used for the last quarter of 1969. The
choice of this variable is not theory driven, and one needs to be careful not to introduce too20
many sample specific variables into the model. The resulting gain in fit will then often be lost in
terms of forecasting performance.
The model estimates are presented in Table 7, but before looking at them we have to analyse
the statistical adequacy of the equation. Diagnostic test results are displayed in Table 6. As
before, none of the test statistics indicate a violation of the null hypotheses. The standard error
of the regression is very small.
The forecasting properties are good, as can be seen from Figure 6. We find the temporary
break in the beginning of 1991 again, which is connected with the turbulence of German
money after reunification. If the model was extended to estimate the money demand function
including the observations from the 1990s, a dummy variable was sufficient to take account of
this outlier. Apart from that, all observations stay within their respective confidence intervals.
It is reassuring to see that the inclusion of an additional impulse dummy has not improved the
fit of the model at the expense of its out-of-sample stability.
Fig. 6: Out-of-sample forecasts of broad money demand equation
Computing recursive Chow-tests to further explore the stability properties reveals the
following picture (see Figure 7). Here we observe some violation of the one-step stability tests.
It can be argued, though, that most of these are simply outliers, especially the ones connected
with the oil crisis in 1973. This conclusion is strengthened by the finding that none of the other
two tests – decreasing and increasing test period – show any violations.









Fig. 7: Recursive Chow-tests for narrow money model
Finally, we look at the test of overidentifying restrictions computed recursively in Figure 8.
Fig. 8: Recursive encompassing test for broad money
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It is apparent that the test never rejects even though it gets close to being significant at the end
of the 1970s. Thus the restriction on the VAR appears to be valid over the sample period.
Next we come to the actual estimates of broad money demand in the short-run (see Table 7).
Tab. 7: Estimating a dynamic model of broad money
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob. HCSE
Equation for DLMQ
DLMQt-1 0.18 0.066 2.78 0.0066 0.058
DLMQt-3 0.13 0.055 2.36 0.0205 0.048
DINTt-2 -0.01 0.002 -3.24 0.0017 0.002
DINFt -0.43 0.145 -2.95 0.0040 0.148
ECMLMQt-1 -0.02 0.004 -5.79 0.0000 0.004
DU69Q4 -0.03 0.007 -4.55 0.0000 0.002
DU86Q4 0.05 0.007 7.71 0.0000 0.003
DU87Q1 0.06 0.008 6.97 0.0000 0.004
Constant 0.01 0.003 3.91 0.0002 0.002
Seasonalt -0.03 0.002 -11.9 0.0000 0.002
Seasonalt-1 -0.01 0.002 -5.01 0.0000 0.002
Seasonalt-2 -0.02 0.003 -8.50 0.0000 0.003
The first regressors explaining short-run money demand are money lagged one and three
periods. Hence inertia appears to be important in explaining the actual value of money growth.
Both parameters are positive indicating that higher money growth in one period has a positive
influence on money growth in the future.
The second influence is the change in the interest rate. Economic agents react to changes in
opportunity cost with a lag of two quarters. But then money holdings will be reduced. Thus in
addition to the importance of the interest rate for the long-run equilibrium, we also observe a
negative short-run effect. Again we find that current inflation plays a role and - as in the case
of narrow money - it has a restraining effect on money demand. The error-correction term
shows a negative coefficient and is significantly different from zero, while its absolute value is
small. Consequently, deviations from the long-run equilibrium do not exert a strong influence
on actual money growth. Finally we have the dummy variables capturing breaks, outliers and
seasonal effects.
It is interesting to note that in the short-run GDP growth does not appear to play a role in this
system apart from its influence via the error-correction term. This might be due to the fact that
its influence through the long-run equilibrium is relatively stronger compared to the case of23
narrow money resulting from the much lower weight of the interest rate in the cointegrating
relation. Moreover, the decision to hold broad money is less dependent on transaction
purposes.
6. Conclusion
To summarise the results of this paper, we should note the following: The estimated money
demand functions for prospective EMU member countries appear to be stable over time. For
both narrow and broad money aggregates do we find an income elasticity of money demand of
unity. With respect to interest rate (semi-)elasticities, a value of 0.10 was estimated for narrow
and 0.023 for broad money. The higher sensitivity of narrow money aggregate to changes in
the interest rate could reflect the fact that it contains less interest bearing components and thus
people suffer relatively higher opportunity costs after a rise in interest rates than by holding
broad money.
Coming back to some of the points raised in the introduction or discussed in section 2, the
following, more or less tentative, additional conclusions can be drawn from this study:
First, can we say something more about the aggregate series we have been working with, are
they making any economic sense? Looking at the results, the answer is a clear yes. They are
consistent with the other estimates presented in the literature, even though this does not say
much about the general admissibility of modelling European aggregate demand functions. But
the estimated long-run parameters are very reasonable from a theoretical point of view too,
they are robust with respect to the size of country group, and they fall within the interval
spanned by estimating the long-run component of national money demand functions as well
(see Hayo (1998)). If one believes in the fruitfulness of estimating money demand functions in
this way (see Hoffman and Rasche (1996) for some forceful arguments), the backward
induction from the reasonableness of the results to the validity of the employed series suggests
taking the analysis seriously. It should be clear, though, that the methodological basis of
backward justification is rather questionable, especially if one does not adhere to a strictly
instrumentalist view of science.
Unsurprisingly, the aggregate series are much smoother than the underlying national ones.
While the number of lags needed to remove any autocorrelation from the residuals can be quite
large for some countries, this is no problem at all for the aggregate series. The VAR can be24
modelled with only few lags and, correspondingly, the short-run dynamics of the aggregate
series are somewhat underdeveloped. This is a discovery also reported by almost all European
money demand studies. Using a slightly different econometric approach, Clausen (forthcoming)
systematically compares the estimated adjustment lags of national versus European money
demand functions for the actual EMU founding members. Based on the result of shorter
adjustment lags for the European money demand equation, he goes on to argue that the ECB
will find it easier to pursue monetary policy than the national central banks.
The finding of relatively short adjustment lags may not be a problem in principle, but it leaves
unanswered the uncomfortable question: why is it the case that adjustment is, generally
speaking, complicated and long at the national level and simple and swift at the aggregate
level? One possible answer to this is to argue that shocks to money demand functions are
asymmetric across countries and by aggregating the series these shocks cancel each other out,
leading to a smoother overall appearance. If, after entering EMU, there is only the Euro left,
we cannot be sure that this smoothing effect will prevail.
A similar point can be raised regarding the finding of cointegrating vectors. At a national level
it can be quite difficult to obtain theoretically consistent and significant cointegrating vectors
for some countries, while this is not a problem at all for the European series. For example, the
sensitivity of estimated aggregate cointegrating vectors with respect to the chosen lag length is
low. Beside the asymmetric shock smoothing argument, we could bring in the points related to
money market integration, especially involving currency substitution. But it is unclear how
much weight this argument can bear. We have used data ranging back to the sixties, and
therefore the parameter estimates are very much influenced by an era when currency
substitution definitely did not play a decisive role.
As indicated above, seen from the standpoint of a policy maker, the results of this study are
quite encouraging. The finding that a stable aggregate money demand appears to exist would
make a successful operation of money targeting at a European level possible. Moreover, the
short-run adjustment periods are extremely low, thus also helping to foster the execution of
monetary policies. After accounting for the likely occurrence of temporary and short-term
post-unification noise in the data, the ECB should be able to rely on past data to estimate a
European money demand and maybe other characteristics of the aggregate money market.
However, we can also expect an adjustment of economic agents to this new situation, which
may invalidate the information drawn from past observations in the longer term.25
Finally, at least with respect to the stability of the money demand function, the actual decision
by the European Council on EMU membership can be seen as relatively uncontroversial. The
characteristics of aggregate European money demand functions are very similar over different
country groupings (see Hayo (1998, p. 172ff)). This would make it unlikely that European
money demand would be significantly negatively affected if countries with a relatively less
stable national money demand, like Sweden or the UK, entered EMU at a later stage.26
Appendix
Tab. A1: Variables and Unit-Root Tests
Variable Description ADF-Value Variable ADF-Value
LM log of real narrow money -0.06 [C,S,T,4] DLM -0.88** [C,S]
LMQ log of real broad money -0.007 [C,S,1] DLMQ -0.64** [C,S,T]
LGDP log of real GDP -0.009 [C,S,1,3,6] DLGDP -0.83** [C,S,T,3,4,5]
INT Aggregate interest rate -0.02 [S,1] DINT -0.53** [1]
INF Inflation rate based on
aggregate GDP deflator
-0.07 [S,1,2] DINF -1.8** [1]
Notes: D is the first difference operator. One (two) asterisk(s) indicates a rejection of the Null at the 5% (1%)
significance level. The critical values are taken from MacKinnon (1991). The lags and deterministic variables
(constant, seasonals, trend) used in the final specification of the ADF-test are given in square brackets.27
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